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THE CHALLENGE OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGES MATHEMATICS
W KIP VISCUSI*
ABSTRACT
Proposals to provide juries with specific numerical instructions for setting punitive
damages should bring greater rationality to punitive damages awards. This approach is
tested using evidence from 353 jury-eligible citizens who applied these formulas to a
series of legal cases. Few respondents assessed the correct values of punitive damages
from the standpoint of deterrence. Anchoring effects of appeals by a plaintiffs lawyer
or media coverage of similar awards lead respondents to abandon the punitive damages
formula and set punitive damages based on the anchor. Minorities and the less well
educated were particularly unwilling or unable to apply the recommended punitive dam-
ages formulas.
I. INTRODUCTION
ALONG-STANDING issue in the tort liability reform literature has been
whether there is a need to impose greater structure on the determination of
punitive damages.' Punitive damages awards are highly variable, posing po-
tentially catastrophic outcomes on firms.2 In the summer of 2000 we wit-
nessed a $145 billion punitive damages award against the cigarette industry,
topping the recent $4.8 billion punitive damages award in California in 1999
* John F. Cogan, Jr., Professor of Law and Economics, Harvard Law School. This research was
supported by the Sheldon Seevak Research Fund, the Harvard Olin Center for Law, Economics and
Business, and a grant to the author from the Exxon-Mobil Corporation. DeYett Law provided superb
programming assistance. A preliminary version was presented at the Harvard Law and Economics
Workshop and the American Law and Economics Association meetings. Steven Shavell, Louis
Kaplow, and a referee provided helpful comments.
'See Note, "Common Sense" Legislation: The Birth of Neoclassical Tort Reform, 109 Harv. L.
Rev. 1765, 1769-82 (1996); Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Augmented Awards: The Efficient Evolution
of Punitive Damages, 51 La. L. Rev. 3, 6-14 (1990); Dan B. Dobbs, Ending Punishment in "Punitive"
Damages: Deterrence-Measured Remedies, 40 Ala. L. Rev. 831, 853-63 (1989).
2 See John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 Va.
L. Rev. 139, 139 (1986); Peter Huber, No-Fault Punishment, 40 Ala. L. Rev. 1037, 1037 (1989)
(emphasizing unpredictability); Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive
Damages, 75 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 31-32 (1990).
[Journal of Legal Studies, vol. XXX (June 2001)]
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against General Motors.3 Punitive damages awards have also been the subject
of noteworthy recent Supreme Court decisions, although thus far the Court
has offered no precise guidance as to how juries should set punitive damages
awards.4
Recent experimental work by Daniel Kahneman, David Schkade, and Cass
Sunstein highlights the basic source of the punitive damages variability prob-
lem.5 What they have found in a series of carefully controlled experiments
is that there is a broad consensus among jurors regarding the acceptability
of different kinds of behavior. Thus, people do not have a great deal of
difficulty in arriving at a consensus with respect to the appropriate societal
norms that should be applied. The difficulty instead is that when people map
these concerns into a punitive damages award, there is tremendous variability
in setting these awards. Jurors, in effect, are rudderless as they attempt to
quantify the punitive damages level associated with any given level of reck-
less behavior.
The intent of this paper is to explore potential solutions to the setting of
punitive damages awards in a more rational fashion. This paper will not
attempt to document the rationale for punitive damages reform. Nor will it
examine the functions that punitive damages serve. Rather, the emphasis will
be on exploring the recent proposal by A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven
Shavell to provide juries with a mathematical formula for establishing pu-
nitive damages levels. In particular, they have developed a model jury in-
struction to enable jurors to set punitive damages awards based on what they
and many others believe are valid legal and economic principles.6 By giving
jurors a punitive damages formula that is linked to sound principles for
punitive damages, it might be possible to eliminate the variability of punitive
damages awards as well as the failure of actual jury awards to be based on
' For discussion of the cigarette industry verdict, see Marc Kaufman, Tobacco Suit Award: $145
Billion; Fla. Jury Hands Industry Major Setback, Washington Post, July 15, 2000, at A01. For
discussion of the General Motors suit, see Andrew Pollack, $4.9 Billion Jury Verdict in G.M. Fuel
Tank Case: Penalty Highlights Cracks in Legal System, N.Y. Times, July 10, 1999, at A7; and Ann
W. O'Neill et al., GM Ordered to Pay $4.9 Billion in Crash Verdict Liability, L.A. Times, July 10,
1999, at A1.
'See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 1613, 517 U.S. 559 (1996); id. at
605 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the Court's guideposts for assessing punitive damages as
"provid[ing] no real guidance at all"); id. at 607 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(arguing that punitive awards are "an area dominantly of state concern"); see also TXO Prod. Corp.
v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 475 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[T]he lack of
clear guidance heightens the risk that arbitrariness, passion, or bias will replace dispassionate de-
liberation as the basis for the jury's verdict.").
See Cass R. Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman, & David Schkade, Assessing Punitive Damages (with
Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 Yale L. J. 2071, 2153 (1998); Daniel Kahneman,
David Schkade, & Cass R. Sunstein, Shared Outrage and Erratic Awards: The Psychology of Punitive
Damages, 16 J. Risk & Uncertainty 49, 86 (1998); and David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein, & Daniel
Kahneman, Deliberating about Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1139, 1175 (2000).
6 See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, Ill
Harv. L. Rev. 869, 962 (1998).
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factors that should be most pertinent to establishing punitive damages levels.
This influential article has already begun to receive attention as the most
compelling available elucidation of the formal underpinnings of punitive
damages.7
The punitive damages approach advocated by Polinsky and Shavell focuses
principally on the observation that dates back to Jeremy Bentham that pun-
ishment levels should be related to the reciprocal of the probability of de-
tection. For example, if the chance of detection is 50 percent, then the total
penalty must be twice the value of the harm in order to create the proper
incentives for deterrence on an expected value basis.8
A recent analysis by Sunstein, Schkade, and Kahneman explored two
aspects of the Polinsky-Shavell proposal and did not find support for it.9
Their first test of the approach consisted of a survey of jury-eligible citizens
who considered cases in which there was a differing probability of detection.
They found that changes in the probability of detection did not significantly
influence the level of dollar awards. However, their experiment did not give
participants a copy of the model instructions drafted by Polinsky and Shavell
or describe the reciprocal probability rule for setting damages levels so as
to generate optimal deterrence. The most that can be concluded from this
portion of their study is that people do not intuitively generate the reciprocal
probability formula for setting punitive damages independently.
Their second test of optimal deterrence policies was to present University
of Chicago Law School students with two scenarios and to ask the degree
to which they thought the optimal deterrence approach would be fair. One
scenario involved the imperfect enforcement efforts of the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS)-an agency that might not have been the object of respondent
sympathy given its tax function. The other scenario involved a personal injury
case in which there was the certainty of receiving full compensation, and
there was no imperfect enforcement. The students were not sympathetic to
using punitive damages to address the imperfect enforcement efforts of the
IRS. This result is not consistent with the Polinsky-Shavell view, but it may
be affected by the character of the imperfect enforcement and the agency
involved. Limited budgetary resources, not taxpayer deceit, gave rise to the
IRS's imperfect enforcement. Respondents also did not favor punishing the
offending firm for their second case situation, in which there was perfect
enforcement. This failure to award punitive damages is potentially consistent
with the Polinsky-Shavell jury instructions.
The approach taken here is different. Rather than ask whether people can
Perez v. Z Frank Oldsmobile, Inc., 223 F.3d 616, 621 (7th Cir. July 31, 2000) (Nos. 99-2742,
99-2854, 00-1701, & 00-1786, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 18281, at *7-8).
' See Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Penal Law, I The Works of Jeremy Bentham 365, 401-2
(John Bowring ed., Russell & Russell 1962) (1838-43).
'Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, & Daniel Kahneman, Do People Want Optimal Deterrence?
29 J. Legal Stud. 237, 254 (2000).
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develop the Polinsky-Shavell tests independently or are supportive of the
general methodological approach, this paper tests whether jury-eligible cit-
izens can and will, in fact, apply the Polinsky-Shavell jury instructions. A
sample of jury-eligible citizens considered a series of different case scenarios
in which there was some nonzero probability that the environmental trans-
gression would not be detected. They were then given the Polinsky-Shavell
punitive damages instructions and asked to assess punitive damages for their
case. This exercise consequently will provide a quite direct test of whether
giving jurors an explicit formula for punitive damages will rationalize the
process of setting punitive damages.
The results of this experimental test of the proposed punitive damages
instructions were quite disturbing for those seeking a sound procedure for
setting punitive damages awards. Very few of the 353 jury-eligible respon-
dents in my sample carried out the basic elements of the deterrence calculation
even though they had the assistance of a table that gave them multipliers for
translating compensatory damages values into deterrence values. Respon-
dents were very insensitive to changes in the probability of detecting a
violation, which should have been the key concern for setting deterrence
values based on law and economics principles. Likewise, respondents were
not sensitive to the degree of stealthiness of the defendant's behavior, which
should have been a pivotal factor influencing the punishment value for dam-
ages. What mattered instead was the role of various anchoring effects based
on, for example, suggested values for damages by the plaintiffs attorney.
But such anchoring effects should be completely eliminated if people adhered
to the Polinsky-Shavell formula. The mathematical formulas for guiding jury
behavior in this experiment consequently achieve none of the purported
objectives of the approach and remain vulnerable to the same kinds of con-
taminating influences that could distort punitive damages awards under the
current regime.
II. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS
The jury instructions for punitive damages vary by jurisdiction and with
the nature of the behavior involved in a particular case. Perhaps the most
pertinent instruction for establishing a quantitative basis for punitive damages
awards is that which details the factors that juries should consider when
setting punitive damages awards: "It is within the discretion of the jury to
award punitive damages. In deciding whether to award punitive damages and
the amount of those damages should you decide to award them, you should
consider the purposes of those damages as expressed to you in these instruc-
tions and you should take into consideration the character of the defendant's
act, the degree or level of wrongdoing of that act, and the necessity of
preventing similar wrongs in the future."1°
" See Ronald W. Eades, Jury Instructions on Damages in Tort Actions 106 (4th ed. 1998).
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Armed with such instructions, jurors have very little guidance as to the
specific numerical measure of punitive damages that should be awarded,
which is what the controlled experiments by Kahneman, Schkade, and Sun-
stein have demonstrated."
In contrast, the punitive damages instructions provided as part of the model
jury instructions by Polinsky and Shavell are quite precise. I tested the effect
of these instructions based on an original experimental design. As part of
my study, each respondent was presented with a copy of punitive damages
instructions that are almost identical to those advocated by Polinsky and
Shavell for cases in which the defendant is a firm. These instructions are
presented here as Exhibit 1 in Appendix A.
As the instructions indicate, there are three parts to setting the level of
punitive damages in the case of losses inflicted by firms, which is the focus
of the experimental cases in my study design. The first component focuses
on the deterrence amount for punitive damages. In situations of imperfect
enforcement, the total penalty should equal the level of damages divided by
the probability of detection. Thus, the punitive damages amount should equal
this value less the amount of compensatory damages. Polinsky and Shavell
summarize this formula in their article as follows: "This discussion suggests
a simple formula for assuring that injurers will pay for the harms they cause:
the total damages imposed on an injurer should equal the harm multiplied
by the reciprocal of the probability that the injurer will be found liable when
he ought to be."' 2 Indeed, more generally, Polinsky and Shavell believe that
this should be the dominant concept used in setting punitive damages, al-
though their article is stronger in this regard than are the jury instructions.
More specifically, they characterize their overall finding regarding punitive
damages as follows: "In summary, punitive damages ordinarily should be
awarded if, and only if, an injurer has a chance of escaping liability for the
harm he causes."'3
Consider the first component of the damages instructions pertaining to
deterrence in Exhibit 1. These instructions give respondents an economic
rationale for imposing a sanction that will provide for deterrence as the first
section of the deterrence discussion. The second component of the deterrence
discussion focuses on determining the probability that the defendant would
have escaped detection. The third component provides respondents with a
table for determining the appropriate amount of punitive damages from the
standpoint of deterrence, which Polinsky and Shavell call the "base punitive
damages amount." The fourth component emphasizes that this amount should
not be adjusted for a variety of other factors, such as the role of litigation
See Kahneman, Schkade, & Sunstein, supra note 5.
2 See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 6, at 889.
See id. at 874.
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costs. The question then asks respondents what the base punitive damages
amount should be.
Part B of the instructions concerns punishment. The Polinsky and Shavell
article is hesitant to recommend an explicit role for punishment in the case
of corporate offenses, as punishment is more appropriate for individual ac-
tions in which the blameworthy parties can be identified. Indeed, the instruc-
tions provided to respondents to assist them in calculating the appropriate
punishment value for the second section of the punitive damages determi-
nation emphasize some of these caveats, such as the importance of keeping
in mind that compensatory damages have already been paid and will lead
to some punishment already. The survey then asks respondents what their
punishment value will be, which is the second component of punitive
damages.
Part C of the instructions in Exhibit 1 asks respondents to determine the
level of punitive damages. The instructions indicate some kind of averaging
process in which the punitive damages amount should be between the de-
terrence answer and the punishment answer, though the weight need not be
one-half. The character of the scenarios and how salient the deterrence and
punishment objectives are within the context of these scenarios will determine
what the appropriate weight should be.
Why these amounts should be averaged at all is not clear theoretically.
For example, suppose that the appropriate deterrence value is $9.9 million,
but the blameworthy employees have left the firm so that the punishment
value is zero. Should the penalty necessarily be reduced below $9.9 million?
Jurors reading these instructions may not be certain as to what the averaging
process should entail.
What is clear from the inspection of the Polinsky-Shavell formulas in
Exhibit 1 is that juries have a much more precise guide than existing in-
structions provide as to what their task should be in determining punitive
damages. The instructions give them a rationale for the deterrence objective
and an explicit mathematical formula for setting these deterrence values. The
instructions then give them a discussion of the punishment objective but no
explicit formula for setting punishment values. Finally, the instructions give
them guidance with respect to setting the punitive damages level on the basis
of their deterrence and punishment answers, and these instructions serve to
bound the punitive damages amount by restricting it to be a value between
the deterrence value and the punishment value.
These instructions raise a number of interesting issues with respect to jury
performance that have yet to be addressed by previous research. Can and
will juries successfully implement these formulas in carrying out the punitive
damages assessment task? Setting punitive damages for deterrence and de-
termining of the overall damages amount involve tasks in which there is an
explicit way of determining whether juries are right or wrong in their efforts.
To what extent will juries be able to handle the mathematical task correctly?
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The punishment objective is more open-ended and less amenable to an ex-
plicit test of whether juries are behaving knowledgeably. Nevertheless, one
can ascertain whether juries are responsive to the character of the behavior
of the defendant and the other details of the case in setting the punishment
amount, which is what one would expect if juries are behaving rationally.
If instructions are to be effective, then possibly extraneous aspects of the
case should not impede jurors' ability to carry out the instructions. A phe-
nomenon that has played a salient role in the literature is that of anchoring
effects in which plaintiffs' attorneys present jurors with a dollar anchor that
contaminates the deliberation process.4 If in fact jurors adhere to the explicit
mathematical formula specified in Exhibit 1, then that should greatly reduce
the influence of anchoring effects and similar phenomena that would lead to
the kinds of random punitive damages awards that might otherwise be ob-
served. This hypothesis will be explored as an additional test of the efficacy
of the instructions.
III. STUDY DESIGN AND SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
A. Experimental Design
The effect of the instructions was tested using a sample of jury-eligible
adults who considered a legal case using these instructions. Each respondent
considered one of five different scenarios involving the disposal of 12 drums
of dangerous chemicals by an industrial chemical research firm. The nature
of my experimental design is to present different subgroups of the sample
with different scenarios and to compare the responses across the different
experimental treatments. In each instance, respondents applied the Polinsky-
Shavell formulas. By altering the characteristics of the scenario presented to
the respondent, it is possible to assess the incremental effect of different
aspects of the case on the performance of the jury instructions. Moreover,
in every instance, it will also be possible to develop tests that ascertain
whether in fact the respondents adhered to the Polinsky-Shavell formula.
The text of the five different scenarios appears in Appendix B.
In addition to the scenarios in which respondents considered the Polinsky-
Shavell formula, the experiment also included a sixth scenario for a group
of 69 respondents who considered a case in which there was no such formula
presented. These respondents had the more standard punitive damages for-
mula guidance and considered a case that was identical to those considered
by the Polinsky-Shavell formula sample except for a somewhat different
damages amount. However, by rescaling the damages amount, it is possible
"Anchoring effects, which are well established in the psychology literature, have ramifications
for jury behavior as well. See Reid Hastie, David A. Schkade, & John W. Payne, Judgments in Civil
Cases: Hindsight Effects on Judgments of Liability for Punitive Damages, 23 Law & Hum. Behav.
455, 470 (1999).
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TABLE I
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES Toxic WASTE DUMPING SCENARIOS
Probability
Scenario of Detection Character of Dumping Anchoring Information
1 .25 Not stealthy None
2 .01 Not stealthy None
3 .01 Stealthy midnight dumping None
4 .01 Stealthy midnight dumping Plaintiff's attorney requests
minimum penalty of
$25 million, ideally
$50 million
5 .01 Stealthy midnight dumping Similar case in news with
$50 million award
reduced on appeal
to $25 million
to make a direct comparison of the results as these scenarios were otherwise
identical. 1
5
Table 1 summarizes the experimental structure that was used. In scenario
1 there is a .25 probability that the illegal dumping will be discovered by
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) inspector. The company was in
fact caught and fined $100,000 to cover the additional water treatment costs.
The respondents then had to determine the appropriate value of punitive
damages. The other scenarios varied the character of the dumping and the
probability of detection but not the damages amount.
By its very nature, the experimental design that I have constructed focuses
on differences across the scenarios rather than the absolute levels of re-
sponses. As a consequence, factors that are common to each of the scenarios
will tend to net out when making the comparisons. In each instance, people
considered the scenarios as individuals, not as group. They also did not
participate in an actual trial. However, these and other elements are common
across all scenarios. The distinctive nature of the experiment is that by com-
paring the effects across different experimental treatments, it is possible to
isolate whether there is in fact any responsiveness to the key aspects of the
experimental design that are pertinent to assessing how individuals will apply
the Polinsky-Shavell instructions.
The imperfect enforcement in scenario 1 did not arise from any stealth on
the part of the manager responsible for the dumping. Rather, as the survey
indicated, "[t]he manager knew that there was a 25 percent chance that the
EPA inspector was going to be visiting the plant next week, and that if he
did the dumping would be discovered." Thus, in this scenario, there is no
attempt on the part of the shift manager to take an action that would decrease
"s In particular, to achieve the rescaling, one simply multiplies the results for the conventional
damages findings by a factor of five.
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the probability of being caught, so the 25 percent chance of being caught
could be viewed as an exogenous probability. For this scenario there was no
anchoring information given by the plaintiff's attorney or from any other
source.
With scenario 1 as with the other scenarios, it is possible to determine
whether the respondents apply the implications of the Polinsky-Shavell in-
structions properly. In particular, is the deterrence value calculated accurately,
and is the overall punitive damages amount some value that is bounded by
the deterrence value and the punishment value?
Scenario 2 is in some ways identical to scenario 1, as the probability of
detection below 1.0 arises from exogenous factors rather than the stealth of
the dumping company. For scenario 2, the probability of detection is 1 per-
cent. Based on the reciprocal probability rule for setting punitive damages,
the appropriate level of punitive damages with a .25 probability of detection
is three times the value of the damages inflicted, and for a .01 probability
of detection, it is 99 times as great. 6 Thus, if the respondents were perfectly
rational, then the deterrence value of punitive damages for scenario 2 should
be 33 times as great as the assessed deterrence value of damages for scenario
1. It should be noted that the .25 probability of detection for scenario 1 lies
between two probabilities in the punitive damages table appearing in Exhibit
1 (Table Al), which gives the appropriate value of damages if the probability
of detection is 70 percent or 80 percent. Applying these values leads to a
potential damages range from $233,000 to $400,000, whereas with a .01
probability of detection the appropriate damages amount for deterrence is
$9.9 million. If one treats as correct any damages value in this range for
scenario 1, then the appropriate ratio of damages for scenario 2 to that of
scenario 1 should be in the range of 24.8-42.4 if respondents are applying
the deterrence table properly.
In scenario 3 there is the same probability of detection as in scenario 2,
but the scenario is altered so that the reason why there is a low probability
of being caught is that the dumping firm engages in a stealthy midnight
dumping to avoid detection. In particular, the chemical manager took the
following precautions to avoid being detected: "To prevent being caught, his
crew loaded the chemical drums onto unmarked trucks and dumped the
chemicals in a rural stream at 3:00 A.M. The manager believed that this
'midnight dumping' would reduce the risk of getting caught to 1 in 100.
Thus, there was a 99 percent chance of escaping any penalty. He decided
that it was worth the gamble because it was the fastest way to get rid of the
chemicals, and it was dangerous to keep the chemicals."
Giving respondents information regarding the stealthiness of the activity
that led to the imperfect enforcement has two potential ramifications. First,
6 Overall damages including compensatory damages should be four times as great as the loss
with a .25 probability of detection and 100 times as great with a .01 probability.
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if respondents do not apply the deterrence damages formula in situations in
which the low probability of detection does not arise from stealthy behavior
on the part of the company, then indicating that the dumping arose from
evasive behavior may increase the credibility of the deterrence approach,
thus overcoming some of the reluctance that people may have to use this
formula.t7 The second ramification of stealthy behavior is that it makes the
parties more appropriate targets for a high punishment value for punitive
damages. In this example, we now have a shift manager who undertakes the
deceitful act and who might be responsive to financial penalties levied on
the company, so punitive damages in this instance may cause defendants to
penalize their "blameworthy employees who engaged in reprehensible be-
havior," as the punishment instructions in Exhibit 1 indicate. By comparing
the results for scenario 3 with scenario 2, it is possible to determine whether
these two influences are operative.
Scenario 4 has the identical fact situation to scenario 3, except that there
is an additional complication regarding a plaintiffs attorney request for a
damages amount. In particular, the attorney suggests that the appropriate
penalty would be $50 million and that the minimum penalty should be $25
million. Will such dollar values serve as an anchor that influences jury
thinking? On the basis of the Polinsky-Shavell formula, calculating the de-
terrence value of punitive damages is a strictly mathematical exercise that
should be independent of such anchoring effects. Similarly, the total punitive
damages amount should lie between the deterrence values and the punishment
values irrespective of such anchoring. However, the punishment value itself
could potentially be influenced, and it may also be the case that juries do
not properly respond to the jury instructions but instead are influenced by
anchoring effects. Anchoring biases are a well-documented phenomenon in
the literature, but past studies have not considered the efficacy of jury in-
structions that narrowly constrain jurors to behave in a way that should
eliminate anchoring effects. By comparing the results for scenario 4 with
those of scenario 3, it will be possible to assess whether anchoring does in
fact have an influence.
Scenario 5 explores the influence of a different source that might produce
anchoring. Instead of hearing the pleas of a plaintiffs attorney regarding
appropriate damages levels, suppose that jurors have in fact read about pen-
alties levied in similar cases elsewhere. Such information is frequently avail-
able to jurors, especially with respect to products for which there is a national
line of litigation. How does this information affect the setting of punitive
damages?
In scenario 5, what juries receive is information that they have read in a
newspaper article describing a similar case in which the jury awarded punitive
" This reluctance was a central theme of the results of Sunstein, Schkade, & Kahneman, supra
note 9.
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TABLE 2
SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
Mean SD
Age 41.35 12.10
Female .59 .49
White .63 .48
Black .13 .33
Hispanic .20 .40
Other nonwhite races .05 .21
High school .13 .34
Some college .32 .47
College graduate .37 .48
Professional degree .17 .38
Smoker .16 .36
Seat belt user .90 .30
NOTE.-The sample size is 353 for the respondents consid-
ering one of the scenarios 1-5.
damages of $50 million, but this amount was reduced on appeal to $25
million. As with the anchoring results in scenario 4, the question is whether
this anchoring information based on publicity will alter the results when
compared to those of scenario 3, which did not include any anchoring in-
formation. Moreover, there is an additional comparison of interest, which is
whether anchoring information based on media coverage is more or less
influential than the anchoring information arising from the pleas by the plain-
tiffs attorney. Thus, the comparison of the results of scenario 5 with those
of scenario 4 will be of interest as well.
B. Sample Characteristics
The participants in this study consisted of 353 adult respondents, all of
whom were jury-eligible citizens in the Austin, Texas, area. An additional
69 respondents considered a scenario not based on the Polinsky-Shavell
formula. A marketing research firm contacted these respondents by phone
and brought them to a central location in July 2000. Each respondent was
paid $40 to complete a survey that was approximately 30 minutes in length.
The demographic mix of the respondents for the five principal scenarios is
summarized in Table 2. The average age is 41 years. The sample includes
a good mix by gender (59 percent female) and race, as 13 percent are black,
20 percent are Hispanic, and 5 percent are other nonwhite races. The re-
spondent education levels are concentrated among high school graduates and
those who have had at least some college. The survey also ascertained
whether the individual was a regular smoker and whether the respondent
always used seat belts, as these variables may serve as proxies for attitudes
toward risk bearing and may affect willingness to impose punitive damages.
The results discussed below will focus chiefly on the overall sample find-
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ings, although there will be an attempt to analyze differences across dem-
ographic groups as well. A later section of this article presents a multiple
regression analysis that analyzes the independent influence of each of these
demographic factors on the chief variables of interest.
Each participant recruited for my study was told that they would participate
in an opinion study. The first page of the survey provided the following
information to establish the legal context of the survey: "You will consider
a series of legal case situations. You will be allowed as much time as you
need to review the information. Please indicate your best judgment with
respect to each question. In almost all instances there are no right or wrong
answers. We are interested in your assessments, and people can feel differ-
ently about the cases." While most of the questions in the survey pertained
to legal case situations, the final question contained a series of assessments
regarding the size of different firms in the area. This question had no apparent
relevance to legal matters although it was used in a separate analysis to
explore the attitude of respondents to firms based on their size. Because this
question was last in the survey, it should not affect the legal orientation of
the previous questions.
Before considering the toxic dumping case in the Polinsky-Shavell punitive
damages instructions, respondents also were given general instructions re-
garding their role in considering the case as well as a general instruction that
would provide the standard type of legal rationale for punitive damages:
Below you will consider a series of legal cases. In every instance, the trial jury has already
ordered each defendant to pay compensatory damages as full compensation for the harm
suffered by the plaintiff. We would like you to imagine that you are a member of the
punishment jury. Your job is to decide whether and how much each defendant should be
punished, in addition to paying compensatory damages.
As a jury member, you are instructed to award punitive damages if a preponderance
of the evidence shows that the defendants acted either maliciously or with reckless dis-
regard for the welfare of others. Defendants are considered to have acted maliciously if
they intended to injure or harm someone or their property. Defendants are considered to
have acted with reckless disregard for the welfare of others if they were aware of the
probable harm to others or their property but disregarded it, and their actions were a gross
deviation from the standard of care that a normal person would use.
The overall structure of the survey consequently established a strong sense
of the legal context that a typical juror would face in a real-world situation.
Respondents were very much aware that they should treat the legal situation
as if they were members of a jury. Moreover, they received a general back-
ground regarding the legal basis for punitive damages. They then considered
the specific toxic dumping case scenario and, on the basis of the Polinsky-
Shavell punitive damages instructions, established damages levels pertinent
to the case. Notwithstanding these efforts to create a realistic experimental
situation, it should nevertheless be noted that the assessed behavior is for an
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
TABLE 3
ACCURACY OF DETERRENCE RESPONSES (by Percentage)
Final Award
Missing Deterrence Final Award in Range and
Scenario Responses Value Correct in Range Deterrence Correct
1 9 20 73 19
2 6 11 79 11
3 4 21 75 18
4 7 7 76 6
5 9 14 78 14
All 7 15 76 14
experimental context. In an actual case situation, respondents may take their
task more seriously, which may possibly improve their performance.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
How well did the respondents perform in carrying out the Polinsky-Shavell
punitive damages instructions? The answer to this question depends on a
variety of tests and comparisons involving the different scenarios.
Table 3 summarizes the overall statistics pertaining to the accuracy of the
deterrence responses in terms of whether the respondents could successfully
apply the mathematical formula in part A of the instructions. The statistics
there pertain to the results for each of the versions of the survey as well as
for the overall findings. The first column of statistics indicates the percentage
of the sample for which responses were missing. A value of zero would not
be considered missing, but overall about 7 percent of the sample simply drew
a blank in terms of being able to solve the problem. Many simply put a
question mark by the answer for calculating the deterrence amount or made
some rough but unsuccessful attempts to begin a numerical calculation. The
subsequent analysis in Section VI will indicate that these respondents were
not random but, in fact, were concentrated among the groups whom one
might expect to have some difficulty in carrying out the numerical calcu-
lations required. While the Polinsky-Shavell instructions generated a signif-
icant number of missing values that averaged 7 percent across all five of the
experimental treatments, the case scenario in which respondents received
conventional punitive damages instructions but not the Polinsky-Shavell for-
mula had no missing values among the 69 respondents. Thus, a general lack
of attention to the survey task within the context of my experiment does not
appear to be the explanation for the missing values that were observed when
respondents were asked to carry out the tasks outlined in the Polinsky-Shavell
instructions.
The next column of statistics in Table 3 pertains to those who calculated
the deterrence value correctly. For scenario 1, all responses between 233,000
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(probability of escaping liability of 70 percent) and 400,000 (probability of
escaping liability of 80 percent) were treated as correct. The overall average
value of correct responses is 15 percent for all five scenarios, as this amount
ranges from 7 percent for scenario 4 to 21 percent for scenario 3. Thus, only
a small minority of the respondents can handle the key deterrence value
calculation correctly.
Several differences are noteworthy. First, the introduction of stealthy be-
havior in scenario 3 as opposed to scenario 2 almost doubles the frequency
with which respondents assess the correct value of punitive damages, which
is $9.9 million based on the fact scenario. Stealthy behavior apparently in-
creases the willingness of respondents to apply the deterrence damages for-
mula.' s The second noteworthy comparison is that the percentage of correct
answers equal to 7 percent for scenario 4 is substantially below that for the
equivalent scenario 3, where the only difference is that scenario 4 included
an anchoring plea for a penalty by the plaintiff's attorney.' 9 This anchoring
plea led to the lowest percentage of correct calculations of punitive damages
for deterrence for any of the scenarios in the table. In this situation in which
there was a potential anchoring, respondents in effect ignored the mathe-
matical table in assessing punitive damages. The anchoring effect of the
media coverage of a related punitive damages case in scenario 5 also de-
creases the accuracy of respondents' application of the formulas when com-
pared to the results in the parallel scenario 3, but to a lesser extent than does
the plaintiff's attorney anchoring effect in scenario 4.
The fourth column of statistics in Table 3 pertains to whether the final
award is in the appropriate range as dictated by the punitive damages in-
structions. In particular, the instructions specifically indicate that the punitive
damages amount should be between the deterrence value and the punishment
value. Roughly three-fourths of the sample gave responses that satisfied this
requirement. Overall, 76 percent of the respondents gave a final punitive
damages amount that was in the appropriate range. This task apparently is
a relatively minor mathematical stumbling block when compared to the initial
calculation of the deterrence value based on the reciprocal of the probability
of detection.
The overall test for mathematical correctness is whether respondents cal-
culated the deterrence value correctly and whether their final answer was
also in the appropriate range. As the final column of statistics in Table 3
indicates, virtually all respondents who calculated the deterrence value cor-
rectly also gave a final punitive damages value that was in the correct range.
'8 The percentage of respondents with correct deterrence values is significantly different between
scenarios 2 and 3 at the 89 percent level, two-tailed test, thus falling short of the usual standards
of significance.
'9 The percentage of respondents with correct deterrence values is significantly different between
scenarios 3 and 4 at the 95 percent level, two-tailed test.
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TABLE 4
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES TO DIFFERENT QUESTIONS (by Percentage)
Deterrence Value Deterrence Value Deterrence Value
Scenario Exceeds Punishment Equals Punishment Below Punishment
1 48 13 39
2 50 15 35
3 54 9 38
4 43 23 34
5 49 11 40
All 49 14 37
NOTE.-All percentage estimates are for sample excluding missing values.
Overall, 14 percent of the sample satisfied both of these mathematical tests.
The low value was that only 6 percent of the respondents met these requi-
rements for the anchoring scenario 4, as the effect of the anchor swamped
the respondents in their efforts to apply the instructions.
The calculation of the punishment values as the second part of the punitive
damages assessment process has less of a firm mathematical basis. However,
one would expect the emphasis on punishment to increase with the stealth-
iness of the employee's actions. Table 4 presents a distribution of the rela-
tionship between the deterrence values and the punishment values assessed
by respondents. In 49 percent of the cases the deterrence value exceeds the
punishment value, and in 37 percent of the cases the deterrence value is
below the punishment value. Overall, 14 percent of the respondents had equal
values for both deterrence and punishment.
The key pair of results for testing the influence of stealthy behavior is the
difference between scenario 2, in which the employees were not stealthy,
and the otherwise identical scenario 3, in which there is stealthy midnight
dumping. While 3 percent more respondents had punishment values ex-
ceeding deterrence values for scenario 3 as compared to scenario 2, an almost
identical 4 percent of the respondents were more likely to have deterrence
values exceeding punishment values. The main change was the decrease in
the number of respondents giving equal values for both deterrence and pun-
ishment. Thus, there seems to be no apparent effect of stealthy employee
behavior on the relative degree of punishment assessed by respondents, which
is not what one would expect if respondents are following the punitive
damages instructions.
Perhaps the most interesting outlier of the results in Table 4 consists of
the findings for scenario 4, for which there is a high value of 23 percent of
the respondents setting equal values for deterrence and punishment. This
result is reflective of the strong influence of anchoring effects on both de-
terrence and punishment values, which will be examined in greater detail
below.
Given the explicit nature of the jury instructions in Exhibit 1, the actual
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TABLE 5
DISTRIBUTION OF DAMAGES VALUES
A. DETERRENCE VALUE
95% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL
SCENARIO MEDIAN MEAN Lower Upper
1 355,500 2,904,242 -252,651 6,061,135
2 500,000 3,772,735 1,705,618 5,839,853
3 (full) 900,000 3,827,285 2,558,153 5,096,417
3 (trimmed)' 900,000 3,737,981 2,462,461 5,013,501
4 25,000,000 34,079,231 22,241,351 45,917,110
5 9,900,000 20,132,381 11,433,260 28,831,502
B. PUNISHMENT VALUE
95% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL
SCENARIO MEDIAN MEAN Lower Upper
1 300,000 5,613,678 894,762 10,332,594
2 300,000 1,416,485 687,395 2,145,575
3 (full) 500,000 145,854,864 -140,383,180 432,092,907
3 (trimmed)' 500,000 2,411,553 1,506,967 3,316,139
4 25,000,000 29,186,615 21,995,760 36,377,471
5 10,000,000 16,371,905 10,916,862 21,826,947
C. FINAL PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARD
95% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL
SCENARIO MEDIAN MEAN Lower Upper
1 475,000 5,717,022 1,088,980 10,345,064
2 500,000 3,521,074 504,870 6,537,277
3 (full) 800,000 146,610,261 -139,606,574 432,827,096
3 (trimmed)' 800,000 3,178,059 2,001,817 4,354,301
4 26,000,000 34,844,000 26,621,790 43,146,210
5 12,650,000 22,295,476 14,177,745 30,413,207
' The trimmed sample excludes one respondent who assessed a $9.9 billion value for the punishment amount
and the final punitive damages award.
level of damages assessed by respondents is of interest as well. Table 5
presents the distribution of damages values for each of the components of
the damages calculation. Panel A of Table 5 presents the deterrence values
for the survey versions.
For scenario 1, the correct value of damage is $300,000, but values of
$233,000-$400,000 are permissible since the probability of escaping liability
lies in a range of values in the deterrence calculation table in Exhibit 1. The
median response of $355,500 is quite plausible, but the mean value is roughly
an order of magnitude greater than is appropriate because of the influence
of the high damage assessments.
For scenario 2 and in all subsequent surveys in which the probability of
detection is 1 percent, the correct deterrence value based on Exhibit 1 is $9.9
million. Comparison of scenarios 1 and 2 provides a direct test of whether
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respondents are sufficiently sensitive to the change in the probability of
detection, which decreases from 25 percent in scenario 1 to 1 percent in
scenario 2, which leads to an optimal deterrence amount in scenario 2 that
is 33 times greater than that in scenario 1, or a range of 24.8-42.4 times
greater given the range of guidance provided by the values in the table in
Exhibit 1. Notwithstanding the major difference in the probability of detec-
tion, the actual deterrence values assessed are only slightly different for these
two scenarios. The median response in scenario 2 is $500,000, which is only
1.4 times as great as the median response in scenario 1, whereas it should
have been much more than an order of magnitude greater. Similarly, the mean
response is only 1.3 times as great, which also indicates a substantial insen-
sitivity to the probability of detection. Quite simply, respondents are ignoring
the guidance of the deterrence table and are not taking into account the
differing value of the detection probability when setting the optimal deter-
rence amount.
The results for scenario 3 indicate a higher median value, but a mean
value that is almost the same as scenario 2. For scenario 3, I report two sets
of results. One set of results reports findings for the full sample of respondents.
The second set of results omits one respondent who assessed $9.9 billion
for both the punishment value and the final punitive damages award. This
person is trimmed to eliminate the effect of this outlier on the punishment
and deterrence values. The deterrence value responses for scenario 3 are
greater than those for scenario 2 in terms of the median response, as the
presence of stealthy behavior increases the deterrence value levied. However,
on the basis of the punitive damages formula it should have no influence.
This result suggests that the character of the behavior leading to the low
probability of detection may increase respondents' willingness to apply the
formula.
The anchoring effect in scenario 4 proves to be dominant. The plaintiffs
attorney gives respondents a minimum award level of $25 million and a
desired award of $50 million. This information increases the median assessed
deterrence value to $25 million and the mean value to $34 million. Respon-
dents, in effect, abandon the constraints imposed by the deterrence value
table and base their judgments largely on the anchoring influence.
Matters are less bleak for the results for scenario 5, in which there is
information from media coverage of a similar case. The deterrence value for
the median respondent equals the correct deterrence value that should be
assessed given the jury instructions. The influence of these media anchors
consequently serves to boost the deterrence values levied so that the median
respondent is at the correct value, although the mean damages assessed
amount of $20 million is over double the correct deterrence value because
of the influence of the media anchor information.
The punishment values levied by respondents in panel B of Table 5 follow
a pattern quite similar to those for the deterrence values. It is noteworthy
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that the introduction of stealthy behavior for scenario 3 has only a very small
effect on the median punishment value assessed. For the punishment values,
the dominant influence that is apparent is the strong influence of the two
anchoring scenarios. As with the deterrence values, the median damages value
assessed for scenario 4 is $25 million, which is the minimum value that the
plaintiffs attorney recommended as being acceptable.
The final punitive damages awards levied by respondents have median
values that closely parallel the punishment values and the deterrence values.
However, in three of the five scenarios, the final punitive damages award
has a median value that lies outside of the median value range of the de-
terrence and punishment values, which is inconsistent with the general guid-
ance given to setting punitive damages awards. The mean punitive damages
awards are much greater. The highest value is for scenario 3 for the full
sample of respondents to that scenario, as one respondent levied a $9.9 billion
punitive damages award. This individual also answered the deterrence ques-
tion correctly and had a final punitive damages award that was between the
deterrence value and the punishment value, so it does not appear to be an
error by the respondent, but rather a sense that the punishment value should
be greatly boosted above the deterrence amounts.
Although the effect of the Polinsky-Shavell instructions may vary de-
pending on the particular case context, the general influence in this particular
instance appears to be to decrease the assessed value of punitive damages
awards for scenarios in which there is no anchoring effect. The final punitive
damages awards are $800,000 or less for scenarios 1, 2, and 3, which are
lower than the amounts that were found in a sixth version of the survey in
which respondents did not consider the Polinsky-Shavell punitive damages
instructions but instead relied on more standard guidance.21
In the results thus far, the influence of the anchoring manipulations for
scenarios 4 and 5 have been manifested in a variety of ways. A graphic
illustration of their influence is to examine the number of respondents who
gave the anchoring amounts as their deterrence values. Consider the results
in Table 6 for scenarios 1-3, in which there is no anchoring component to
the scenario. One percent of respondents assessed a $25 million deterrence
award, 4 percent assessed a deterrence value between $25 million and $50
million, and no respondents assessed a $50 million deterrence value. For
scenario 4, in which there is a plaintiff's attorney anchor, 20 percent assessed
a $25 million deterrence value, 12 percent assessed a $50 million deterrence
amount, and 17 percent assessed a value between these two extremes. Similar
kinds of influences are apparent for the punishment value for scenario 4,
20 More specifically, for a $20,000 damages value, respondents assessed punitive damages amounts
of $1 million. If the damages value had been $100,000 as in the scenarios in this experiment and
responses were scaled proportionately, the assessed punitive damages value would be $5 million.
However, even the median assessed damages amount without such a proportional adjustment exceeds
the assessed punitive damages using the Polinsky-Shavell formulas for scenarios 1, 2, and 3.
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TABLE 6
EFFECT OF ANCHOR VALUES ON AWARDS (by Percentage of Sample)
Between $25 Million
$25 Million and $50 Million $50 Million
Scenario 1:
Deterrence 0 0 0
Punishment 0 2 2
Final award 0 2 2
Scenario 2:
Deterrence 0 4 0
Punishment 0 0 0
Final award 0 0 0
Scenario 3:
Deterrence 1 0 0
Punishment 0 0 0
Final award 0 0 0
Scenario 4:
Deterrence 20 17 12
Punishment 23 26 6
Final award 9 29 12
Scenario 5:
Deterrence 5 6 10
Punishment 13 0 8
Final award 8 I1 6
except that there is a shift of respondents from the anchoring amount of $50
million to some value between $25 million and $50 million when assessing
punishment. The final award amount for scenario 4 is much more highly
concentrated in the range between $25 million and $50 million than the
previous responses.
Similar but much less dramatic anchoring effects are apparent for scenario
5, in which there is a media coverage anchor. Another notable difference
is that no respondents assessed a punishment value between $25 million and
$50 million, as there is a greater concentration at the two endpoint values.
The final punitive damages levied often is $25 million or more, but the extent
of the effect is not as great as for scenario 4. The media coverage manipulation
continues to have less dramatic influences than does the plea from the plain-
tiff's attorney.
The role of anchors is but one manifestation of the failure of respondents
to think seriously about their responses to each question and to give answers
that are reflective of the jury instructions. An interesting related question is
the extent to which respondents simply gave the same answer to each of the
component punitive damage questions or whether they derived different an-
swers based on the jury instructions. Giving the same answer to, for example,
the deterrence question and the punishment question does not necessarily
reflect an error in interpreting the instructions or a failure to attend to the
survey task. However, if there was a consistent pattern in which respondents
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TABLE 7
RELATION OF FINAL DAMAGES AND DAMAGES COMPONENTS
A. RELATION OF DAMAGES RESPONSES (Percentage of Sample')
SCENARIO
All 1 2 3 4 5
Deterrence = punishment 14 13 15 9 23 II
Deterrence = final 17 11 26 10 23 14
Punishment = final 19 20 21 14 26 16
Deterrence = punishment
=final 10 8 12 4 18 8
B. REGRESSION RESULTS FOR FINAL DAMAGES'
SCENARIO
All 1 2 3 4 5
Deterrence value .359* .263* -. 018 .296* .302* .544*
(.021) (.129) (.144) (.084) (.031) (.036)
Punishment value .821* .728* 2.350* .780* .845* .730*
(.029) (.085) (.405) (.122) (.044) (.053)
Adjusted R2  .886 .746 .341 .762 .934 .957
NOTE.-Values in parentheses are standard errors.
All percentage estimates are for the sample excluding missing values.
The constant terms were never statistically significant and are consequently suppressed. The coefficients for
the other variables are almost identical with and without a constant term. Estimates for scenario 3 are for the
trimmed sample excluding one outlier.
* Statistically significant at the 95% confidence level, two-tailed test.
simply gave the same answer to each of the three punitive damages questions,
it would suggest that they were not differentiating the separate concerns
raised by the different components of the punitive damages instructions.
The findings in panel A of Table 7 indicate that such extreme uniformity
of responses was not evident. There was, of course, some tendency to give
the same answers across questions. For example, 14 percent of the sample
had deterrence values equal to the punishment value, and 10 percent of the
sample gave the same answer to each of the three questions. Alternative
interpretations of my result might suggest that such uniformity reflects a
failure of respondents to be adequately engaged in the survey. However,
these uniform responses occurred in only a minority of the cases. Moreover,
the Polinsky-Shavell formulas give no guidance that indicates that the pun-
ishment value should necessarily differ from the deterrence value. The
greatest frequency of uniform responses across the questions occurs for sce-
nario 4, which has the strong anchoring information based on the appeal by
the plaintiff's attorney. For that survey, 18 percent of the sample gave the
same answer to each of the three punitive damages questions, and approx-
imately one-fourth of the sample gave an identical answer to at least two of
the three punitive damages questions. Anchoring effects consequently serve
to decrease the extent to which the subjects make distinctions across the
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punitive damages categories, which is another reflection of how they un-
dermine the influence of the instructions. However, the majority of the sub-
jects did not exhibit the extreme uniformity across all three categories.
How then do the respondents arrive at their final punitive damages figure?
On the basis of the instructions given to them, the number should be between
the two component punitive damages values. Thus, one can formulate what
respondents did as being some kind of weighted average of their two re-
sponses, where these weights should sum to 1.0.
To test for these relationships, panel B of Table 7 reports the regression
results in which the final punitive damages amount is regressed on the two
component values-the deterrence value and the punishment value. No con-
stant term is included in the regression because on a theoretical basis there
should be no such value as the damages amount should be zero if both the
deterrence value and the punishment value are also zero. The empirical
estimates that included a constant term also indicated effects that were not
statistically significant at the usual levels in every instance, and the coeffi-
cients on the remaining variables were not sensitive to the inclusion of a
constant term. Whereas a coefficient of .5 on the deterrence value and the
punishment value would indicate equal weighting of these two components,
in every instance shown in panel B of Table 7 the punishment value has a
greater weight.2 The weight on the punishment value ranges from .7 for
scenario 1 to a high of 2.4 for scenario 2, with an average across all surveys
of .82. The deterrence value, which is purportedly the more important value
from the standpoint of the Polinsky-Shavell framework, consistently receives
a lower weight than does the punishment value and, in the case of scenario
2, plays no statistically significant role whatsoever in influencing the final
damages value. These results indicate that the mathematical calculations that
produced the first step of the punitive damages calculation, the deterrence
value, were not in fact regarded as the most salient contributor to the re-
spondents' assessment of punitive damages. Rather, it was the more nebu-
lously characterized punishment value that proved to be most instrumental
in setting the punitive damages awards.
A second observation is that respondents did not simply form some kind
of weighted average of the two punitive damages values. Rather, in every
instance the weights sum to a value more than 1.0, with an average across
all survey versions of 1.17. There is consequently a tendency to not treat
the deterrence values and punishment values as simple components of a
weighted average when setting the overall punitive damages level. Rather,
respondents engage in a much more explosive punitive damages calculation
that boosts the overall level of punitive damages above what would result
2 More specifically, based on the pertinent F-tests, one can always reject the hypothesis that the
deterrence coefficient and punishment coefficient are identical.
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from any simple weighting scheme. Appendix C provides more detailed
statistical analysis of how scenario characteristics affect punitive damages.
V. RESULTS FOR SYNTHETIC JURIES
Although individual responses may not always be correct, it could be that
juries would perform much more successfully. The approach that I will take
here will be to construct synthetic juries based on the individual responses.
I will then analyze the median responses of these synthetic juries, which is
generally believed to be indicative of likely jury behavior. Recent experi-
mental work has shown that for punitive damages tasks, actual experimental
juries lead to more extreme results than one would expect on the basis of
the synthetic jury analyses.22 Thus, experimental results in the literature sug-
gest that putting people in a group situation does not eliminate or ameliorate
the problems people have in setting punitive damages amounts. Rather, the
opposite result appears to be the case, as group decisions often fare somewhat
worse. Moreover, there is also experimental evidence indicating that when
considering cases in a group context, there is also little adherence to instruc-
tions, so this aspect of jury performance may not be improved by group
behavior either.23 Consequently, the findings here may understate the extent
to which juries will levy inordinately high punitive damages penalties.
Whether or not actual groups will be more extreme for my particular
experimental context may, of course, differ from past studies. The Polinsky-
Shavell formulas give jurors guidance for which there is, in fact, a correct
answer. Conceivably, jurors who did the deterrence calculation correctly
could convince others to adopt their approach, which is based on basic
arithmetic rather than subjective judgments. In the absence of actual group
interactions to explore such phenomena, I will focus on the role of synthetic
juries, recognizing that actual jury groups could be more or less attentive to
the damages instructions.
The procedure used was to construct 12-person juries by drawing a sample
of 12 individuals at random with replacement from the sample set. For each
scenario a total of 1,000 synthetic juries were constructed, thus providing a
very large sample to enable one to make fairly precise judgments regarding
the likely performance of such juries. In situations in which the sixth- and
seventh-ranked jurors have differing damages amounts to any of the ques-
tions, the midpoint value of their responses served as the median value.
The first question to be addressed is whether the synthetic juries are more
successful in correctly applying the deterrence value calculations. As it turns
22 See Sunstein, Kahneman, & Schkade, supra note 5; Kahneman, Schkade, & Sunstein, supra
note 5; Schkade, Sunstein, & Kahneman, supra note 5; and W. Kip Viscusi, Jurors, Judges, and the
Mistreatment of Risk by the Courts, 30 J. Legal Stud. 107, 142 (2001).
23 See Reid Hastie, David A. Schkade, & John W. Payne, A Study of Juror and Jury Judgments
in Civil Cases: Deciding Liability for Punitive Damages, 22 Law & Hum. Behav. 287, 314 (1998).
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TABLE 8
SYNTHETIC 12-PERSON JURIES WITH
CORRECT VALUE FOR DETERRENCE
DAMAGES AMOUNT
Scenario Percentage Correct
1 74.3
2 .2
3 2.3
4 1.0
5 25.7
out, whether they are or not depends on whether the median respondent on
an individual basis applied the formula correctly. The results in Table 8
provide a quite striking contrast in the relative performance of the juries and
the individual respondents. For scenario 1, 74 percent of the juries gave a
correct answer to the punitive damages deterrence value, as did 27 percent
of the juries for scenario 5. In each instance, the median individual response
to the deterrence question reported in Table 5 was in the correct range.
Somewhat strikingly, for the other three survey versions, no more than 2
percent of any of these juries gave correct values for the deterrence questions.
In these instances, the median respondent on an individual basis was not
close to the correct deterrence value. For scenarios 2 and 3, the individual
responses reported in Table 5 were at least an order of magnitude too low,
and for the anchoring scenario 4, the median deterrence value was more than
twice as great as the correct answer. Thus, in terms of jury performance, the
general implication is that overall juries could perform more success-
fully if the median juror applies the deterrence formulas correctly, but if the
median juror errs considerably, then the jury as a whole will not perform
satisfactorily.
The actual values yielded by the synthetic juries appear in Table 9. The
confidence intervals are very narrow for these responses because of the large
sample of juries. In addition, there is no need to show what the results for
scenario 3 would be with and without the one outlier respondent because
this extreme value never influences the median damages assessment.
There is an extremely close parallel between the responses by the synthetic
juries and the median values in Table 5. The deterrence values assessed in
scenarios 1 and 2 differ by less than a factor of two, which is much less of
an effect than should be expected given the differing probabilities of detec-
tion. As before, the deterrence value for scenario 3 is an order of magnitude
too small, and the deterrence value for scenario 5, in which there is some
anchoring influence, turns out to be correct. The extreme value remains the
jury verdict for scenario 4, in which juries anchor on the $25 million figure.
This anchoring effect continues for the results in panel B, as the median
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TABLE 9
SYNTHETIC JURY RESULTS WITH 1,000 12-PERSON JURIES FOR EACH SCENARIO
A, DETERRENCE VALUE
95% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL
SCENARIO MEDIAN MEAN Lower Upper
1 350,000 368,298 353,419 383,177
2 650,000 723,880 672,375 775,384
3 945,000 1,594,120 1,469,270 1,718,969
4 25,000,000 23,768,150 23,303,441 24,232,859
5 9,900,000 9,831,294 9,444,227 10,218,361
B. PUNISHMENT VALUE
95% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL
SCENARIO MEDIAN MEAN Lower Upper
1 364,500 449,535 426,526 472,544
2 325,000 401,700 384,026 419,374
3 550,000 812,525 766,771 858,279
4 25,000,000 24,903,100 24,566,105 25,240,095
5 10,000,000 10,226,230 9,877,432 10,575,028
C. FINAL AWARD VALUE
95% CONFIDENCE INTERVAL
SCENARIO MEDIAN MEAN Lower Upper
1 525,000 596,078 566,689 625,466
2 500,000 658,037 627,459 688,616
3 837,250 1,176,194 1,109,498 1,242,891
4 27,500,000 28,492,725 28,041,468 28,943,982
5 13,500,000 13,736,375 13,287,342 14,185,408
jury generates a punishment value of $25 million. Indeed, there is little
discrepancy throughout the table between the jury assessments of deterrence
values and punishment values except that the punishment values are smaller
than the deterrence values for scenarios 2 and 3.
The ultimate implications of the individual responses within the context
of these synthetic juries are reflected in panel C of Table 9. The effects of
the different manipulations on jury behavior appear in the damages values
assessed. The anchoring scenario 4 yields the highest median verdict amount
of $27.5 million, with a mean verdict that is quite similar, at $28.5 million.
The next largest jury award is for the media anchoring scenario 5, which
leads to a median award of $13.5 million and a similar mean final award
value. Indeed, a noteworthy implication throughout this table is that the
median jury award and the mean jury award tend to be very similar. Whereas
the mean individual awards in Table 5 were generally considerably higher
than the median award level for every damages response, once people are
put within the context of a 12-person jury for which it is the median juror
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TABLE 10
DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES IN THE ACCURACY OF
THE DETERRENCE VALUE RESPONSES
Correct Incorrect or Missing Incorrect
Age 38.60 41.84 41.91
Female .44 .62* .61 *
White .85 .60* .61 *
Black .06 .14 .14
Hispanic .06 .22* .21 *
Other nonwhite races .04 .05 .04
High school .02 .15* .15*
Some college .19 .35* .35*
College graduate .56 .33* .34*
Professional degree .23 .16 .16
Smoker .15 .16 .15
Seat belt user .90 .90 .90
* The value is significantly different from that in the value correct column at the 95% confidence
interval, two-tailed test.
that drives the value, then there is a dramatic moderating influence on the
award levels.
As before, the damages awards for scenarios 1-3 are considerably smaller.
For scenarios 2 and 3, they are more than an order of magnitude smaller
than would be suggested by the deterrence values calculated using the ap-
proach in Exhibit 1. The award levels assessed for scenarios 1 and 2 are so
close that there appears to be almost no influence whatsoever of the change
in the probability of detection from 25 percent to 1 percent. Respondents
simply failed to incorporate this fundamental aspect of the case scenario into
their assessments. Award levels rise a bit for scenario 3, in which there is
stealthy behavior, as one would expect, but by far the greatest influence is
the anchoring effects present in the final two scenarios.
VI. DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES
How well a set of jury instructions enables jurors to make punitive damages
judgments depends on how the instructions perform on average for a sample
and also on whether all segments of society can comprehend the instructions
and make reliable judgments. Thus, a key issue is whether there is widespread
ability and willingness to apply the instructions or whether there are narrowly
defined segments of the population who do not adhere to the instructions.
On the basis of the previous results, the principal test for the accuracy of
responses is whether the respondent calculated the deterrence value correctly
in setting the base punitive damages amount dictated by the jury instructions
in Exhibit 1. Table 10 provides a breakdown of the sample characteristics
of those respondents who answered the deterrence value correctly, those who
got the deterrence value incorrect or had missing data, and those who got
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the incorrect answer. As is evident, the demographic profile of the incorrect
or missing group is almost identical to those who simply got the answer
incorrect, so for simplicity I will focus on the incorrect or missing column
and compare that to those who answer the question correctly.
Respondent age does not appear to be a particularly influential character-
istic. There is no significant age difference in whether respondents answer
the question correctly.
Gender, however, does appear to be more influential. Whereas 44 percent
of the sample answering the question correctly were women, 62 percent of
those giving incorrect or missing answers were female. This result may be
reflective of a gender difference in mathematical skills, but it also may be
indicative of a greater reluctance by female respondents to surrender their
punitive damages judgment to a mathematical formula.
Two of the racial differences proved to be significant. Overall, 85 percent
of the respondents who answered the deterrence value correctly were white,
as compared to 60 percent who had incorrect or missing values. The opposing
pattern is displayed by the Hispanic respondents, who constitute 6 percent
of the correct respondents and 22 percent of the incorrect respondents. A
similar but less dramatic pattern in exhibited by the black respondents.24
Educational levels proved to be pivotal. Only 2 percent of the sample
giving correct answers had high school educations or less, as compared to
15 percent with incorrect answers. Respondents with some college also ex-
perienced particular difficulties in successfully completing the deterrence
question. The main outlier in terms of overall performance was college grad-
uates, who constituted 56 percent of those with correct answers and 33 percent
of those with incorrect or missing answers. Respondents with professional
degrees also tended to perform disproportionately well, though the differences
are not significant across the different columns.
Although college graduates and those with professional degrees often com-
pleted the survey in a manner that followed the Polinsky-Shavell instructions,
a considerable portion of this group did not carry out these instructions. As
the statistics in the final column of Table 10 indicate, 50 percent of those
who did not give correct deterrence values according to the Polinsky-Shavell
formulas were either college graduates or professionals. Given the fact that
these formulas required only simple multiplication, it would be difficult to
make the case that these individuals were unable to carry out the basic
arithmetic. A more compelling explanation is that many respondents were
simply unwilling to carry out these instructions. This unwillingness is con-
sistent with the similar reluctance to apply this approach on the part of Uni-
24 The difference for the black respondents fell just shy of statistical significance at the 95 percent
confidence level, two-tailed test.
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TABLE 11
PROBIT REGRESSION OF PROBABILITY OF CORRECT
ANSWERS, MARGINAL PROBABILITIES
Asymptotic
Variable Coefficient SE
Age -.003* .001
Female -. 051 .034
Black -. 107* .024
Hispanic -. 083* .030
Other nonwhite races -. 064 .035
Some college .148 .035
College graduate .216* .110
Professional degree .319* .166
Smoker - .005 .043
Seat belt user -. 009 .057
Scenario 2 -. 053 .036
Scenario 3 -. 019 .041
Scenario 4 -. 098* .030
Scenario 5 -. 047 .037
* Coefficient is significant at the 95% confidence level, two-tailed test.
versity of Chicago Law School students, who also did not find the reciprocal
probability rule for setting punitive damages to be a sensible approach."
Attitudes toward risk taking more generally do not appear to be conse-
quential. Neither smoking status nor seat belt use influenced whether re-
spondents answered the questions correctly.
These demographic results are instructive, but they reflect only the partial
influence of each demographic factor considered separately without con-
trolling for influences correlated with these variables. For example, different
demographic groups may vary in terms of their educational levels, so minority
status could be reflecting differences in education rather than differences in
ethnic background more generally.
To analyze these influences, Table 11 provides a probit regression analysis
of the probability that the respondent provided correct answers to the deter-
rence question. The coefficients for the estimates have been transformed so
they have a quite direct interpretation in terms of marginal probabilities. For
example, the coefficient for females of -. 051 means that being a female
decreases the probability of getting the correct answer by 5 percent. What
is noteworthy about these results is that while many patterns closely parallel
the results for the sample characteristic comparisons in Table 10, some are
different.
Age now has a statistically significant influence that is negative. The mag-
nitude of the effect is, however, small, as an increase of 10 years in age of
the respondent decreases the probability of answering the deterrence question
25 See Sunstein, Schkade, & Kahneman, supra note 9.
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correctly by .03. Being female is not significant, as the overall influence
found in Table 10 may be due to other factors correlated with gender, such
as education.
Minority status also appears to be influential for the major groups repre-
sented in the sample. Black respondents have a probability that is .11 lower
and Hispanic respondents have a probability that is .08 lower of answering
the question correctly than that for the group that has been excluded from
the regressions, white respondents. The point estimate for other nonwhite
races is similar to that for Hispanics but is not statistically significant, perhaps
because of the small sample size.
In analyzing education effects, the excluded categorical group consists of
those who have had only some high school education or are high school
graduates. The groups that have superior performance that is statistically
significant are college graduates, who are 22 percent more likely to answer
the deterrence question correctly, and those with professional degrees, who
are 32 percent more likely to answer the deterrence question correctly. Ed-
ucational differences matter even controlling for other background charac-
teristics and respondent ethnicity.
Attitudes toward riskiness as reflected in smoking status and seat belt use
are inconsequential. Because the survey consists of a mathematical task rather
than being a question of whether punitive damages should be high or low,
these risk attitude variables are not correlated with respondent performance.
The final set of variables in the analysis in Table 11 consists of indicator
variables for each of the scenarios other than scenario 1, which serves as
the reference point and basis of comparison. The only scenario variable that
is statistically significant is that for scenario 4, as respondents are 9.8 percent
less likely to handle the calculations correctly than they are for scenario 1.
This result is consistent with the earlier findings that anchoring effects intrude
on respondent performance and diminish the degree to which respondents
take into account the jury instructions as opposed to the anchoring infor-
mation.
The regression results in Table 12 explore the determinants of the damage
award levels as a function of the same set of explanatory variables considered
earlier. The damages award amounts do not appear to be greatly sensitive to
either background characteristics or education levels. The strongest influence
appears to be that of gender, as women assess a lower punishment value and
a lower final award level than do men.
It is particularly interesting that the risk attitude variables are consequential
in the damages value regressions in Table 12. People who wear seat belts
while driving in cars make up those who are less willing to incur risks and
less willing to violate seat belt use laws than are those who do not wear seat
belts. This group of respondents consistently awards greater punitive damages
in every case. The sign of this effect is in the expected direction. The mag-
nitudes of the effect are also considerable. For total award levels, for example,
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TABLE 12
REGRESSION OF DAMAGES AWARD VALUES ON PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS
Deterrence Punishment Final
Variable Value Value Award
Constant 11.476* 13.227* 12.755*
Age
Female
Black
Hispanic
Other nonwhite races
Some college
College graduate
Professional degree
Smoker
Seat belt user
Scenario 2
Scenario 3
Scenario 4
Scenario 5
(.770)
-. 001
(.012)
- .244
(.279)
-. 554
(.425)
.242
(.368)
-. 122
(.706)
.182
(.449)
.368
(.449)
.193
(.526)
.315
(.391)
1.493*
(.458)
.323
(.430)
.800
(.428)
3.295*
(.439)
2.082*
(.439)
(.899)
- .024
(.136)
-. 830*
(.325)
-. 981*
(.496)
.094
(.429)
- 1.000
(.824)
.222
(.524)
.210
(.524)
.889
(.614)
- .067
(.456)
1.050*
(.534)
- .400
(.502)
.227
(.500)
3.285*
(.512)
1.894*
(.513)
(.729)
-. 019
(.011)
-. 672*
(.264)
-. 532
(.402)
.307
(.348)
-. 180
(.668)
.336
(.425)
.580
(.425)
.823
(.498)
.066
(.370)
1.327*
(.433)
- .054
(.407)
.544
(.405)
3.215*
(.416)
2.407*
(.416)
NOTE.-The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of damages. Standard errors are in
parentheses.
* Significant at the 95% confidence level, two-tailed test.
the coefficient implies that seat belt users will make damages awards that
are 277 percent greater than those who do not use seat belts.
The final set of variables in the damages equations in Table 12 consist of
the different scenarios, where once again the omitted category that serves
as the reference point is scenario 1. Both scenario 4 and scenario 5 have
large and statistically significant effects. The influence of the anchoring ef-
fects in each instance is almost identical in terms of their effect on deterrence
values, punishment values, and final award levels for any given survey ver-
sion. As before, the greater influence is for the plaintiff's attorney anchoring
effects in scenario 4, though the media anchors are significant as well.
In the case of both answering the questions correctly and awarding dam-
ages, the survey information, particularly that pertaining to anchoring, proves
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to be influential. However, the role of demographic characteristics was quite
different. Demographic factors in terms of background characteristics play
a much greater role with respect to answering the questions correctly but do
not have any net influence on the level of the various damages values in
most instances. Instead, the additional demographic influence that comes into
play in setting the level of punitive damages is the risk attitude variable
pertaining to seat belt use.
One possible interpretation of the relative insensitivity of the damages
awards to some demographic factors in Table 12 is that respondents were
not devoting serious attention to the survey task. However, I disagree with
this interpretation. Sometimes some variables are not statistically significant
because there is no significant variation with such influences, not because
the underlying experiment is weak. It is also clear from the results in Table
12 that there are several statistically significant influences for the different
survey structures, especially those with anchoring components. In addition,
gender, seat belt use, and to a lesser extent race were significant factors in
driving damages awards. Moreover, the findings in Table 11 for whether the
respondent calculated the optimal deterrence value correctly showed signif-
icant variation by race, education, and inclusion of anchoring information in
the scenario. The large standard errors on some demographic variables are
attributable in part to small sample sizes in particular categories.
VII. CONCLUSION
Can providing jurors with a detailed rationale and mathematical formula
for setting punitive damages solve the problem of random and highly variable
punitive damages awards? The experimental results reported here are not
promising. Few respondents were able to make the key calculation pertaining
to the optimal deterrence value for punishment. A much greater percentage
carried out the second mathematical task of setting a total award value be-
tween the punishment value and the deterrence value, but even this straight-
forward exercise posed difficulties for a significant segment of the population.
Respondents also were not sensitive to the probability of detection, which
is the key parameter of importance in the law and economics perspective on
punitive damages. Perhaps most troubling is that these difficulties are not
random but are highly concentrated among particular demographic groups,
specifically minorities and the less well educated.
The character of the experimental evidence demonstrated that people did
not carry out the Polinsky-Shavell instructions in setting punitive damages.
The experiment did not distinguish whether people were unable to implement
these instructions or were unwilling to follow these instructions. There was
clearly a significant minority of the population who found the basic multi-
plication tasks required too difficult. However, the large portion of college-
educated and professional respondents who did not assess punitive damages
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levels consistent with the Polinsky-Shavell approach suggests that there is
also a substantial problem in motivating individuals to apply the formulas.
This reluctance is consistent with other evidence from University of Chicago
Law School graduates that indicates that people simply do not find this
approach a compelling or reasonable way to assess punitive damages
amounts.
Matters of course may be somewhat different in actual jury contexts if
these formulas were ever adopted. Actual jurors might be more conscientious
in applying the instructions than in an experimental setting. However, seeking
refuge in explanations that lie outside of any feasible experimental structure
ignores the major strength of the experimental design. My study made it
possible to distinguish the incremental effect of different aspects of the design,
such as the probability of detection. Other features of the case and the ex-
perimental context were the same across all respondents. What these results
demonstrate is that changes in the character of the cases simply do not have
the kinds of effects on individual judgments that would be predicted if people
followed the Polinsky-Shavell instructions.
Cases in the real world will not be abstractions but will include a wide
variety of other kinds of information not included in the scenarios tested
here. An example of this kind of information that was incorporated in the
study design consisted of anchoring influences in terms of appeals by a
plaintiff's attorney and media coverage of a related case. The character of
the jury instructions should lead respondents to ignore such anchoring biases
when setting the value of punitive damages for purposes of deterrence. How-
ever, this was not the case, as this supposedly extraneous information
swamped the influence of the quite explicit jury instructions. Respondents
in effect cast aside the formal guidance once presented with some other
damage value anchor that they can use in setting the damages amount.
When going from individual performance to group performance, the driv-
ing factor is the performance of the median juror. In situations in which the
median juror has sound judgment and is able to properly interpret the punitive
damages instructions, the jury performance can be quite good-even much
better than would be expected on the basis of the small minority of individual
respondents who got the correct answer. However, if the median juror has a
deterrence value assessment that is substantially off the mark, then the per-
formance of group decision making in our simulated jury analysis was much
worse than what would be expected on the basis of the individual results.
Previous experimental research suggests that this kind of magnification of
effects may be enhanced even more within the context of actual group de-
liberations. However, whether this magnification will occur with these par-
ticular jury instructions is not clear. There is a correct answer to the optimal
deterrence amount, and this property of the instructions may improve group
decisions.
These results do not imply that one can never devise jury instructions that
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will put punitive damages on sound footing. Nor do they imply that no form
of instructions designed to promote optimal deterrence will ever succeed.
However, they do highlight the challenging character of this task. Many
respondents are simply reluctant or unable to carry out even the most basic
mathematical calculations. Moreover, they appear quite willing to abandon
the jury instructions when they have other rationales for setting punitive
damages that they find to be either more convenient or more compelling.
The findings also highlight the potential of other kinds of reforms of
punitive damages. Some observers have called for greater reliance on judges
in setting punitive damages or the elimination of punitive damages for en-
vironmental and safety torts in which there is a strong government regulatory
presence.26 Unless some form of jury instructions can be devised to provide
greater structure to the process of setting punitive damages, there will con-
tinue to be advocacy of more sweeping reform measures.
The experimental findings also have parallels with respect to other analyses
of jury behavior. Even in situations involving fairly conventional jury in-
structions, there is little evidence that people pay attention to these instruc-
tions when deciding on punitive damages.27 Thus, the criteria for malicious-
ness and reckless behavior tend to play a very small part in conventional
jury deliberations and an even smaller role in the justifications that people
give for punitive damages award decisions. The neglect of the Polinsky-
Shavell jury instructions by my large sample of jury-eligible citizens is
consistent with the performance of juries more generally.
APPENDIX A
EXHIBIT I
In considering the imposition of punitive damages on the defendant, you should
determine three dollar amounts: (A) an amount to accomplish deterrence; (B) an
amount to accomplish punishment; (C) a final amount-your punitive damages
award-between your answers for A and B.
A. DETERRENCE
1. Punitive damages fulfill the deterrence objective to the extent that they deliver
a message and warning to the defendant and to other similarly situated firms to take
appropriate steps to prevent harm in the future. But punitive damages will not fulfill
the deterrence objective if they cause firms to take wasteful steps to prevent harm,
if they cause the prices of products and services to rise excessively, or if they cause
firms to withdraw socially valuable produces or services from the market.
2. To achieve the deterrence objective, your principal task is to estimate the like-
lihood that the defendant might have escaped having to pay for the harm for which
it should be responsible. Thus, for example, if the harm was noticeable and likely
26 See W. Kip Viscusi, The Social Costs of Punitive Damages against Corporations in Environ-
mental and Safety Torts, 87 Geo. L. J. 285 (1998); and Sunstein, Kahneman, & Schkade, supra
note 5.
27 See Hastie, Schkade, & Payne, supra note 23.
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TABLE A l
PUNITIVE DAMAGES MULTIPLIERS
Probability Punitive
of Escaping Damages
Liability (%) Multiplier
0 .00
10 .11
20 .25
30 .43
40 .67
50 1.00
60 1.50
70 2.33
80 4.00
90 9.00
99 99.00
to lead to a lawsuit, your estimate of the likelihood of escaping liability would be
relatively low. But if the harm might not have been attributed to the defendant, or
if the defendant tried to conceal its harmful conduct, your estimate of the likelihood
of escaping liability would be relatively high.
3. You should use the Table below [Table Al] to determine the punitive damages
multiplier that corresponds to your estimated probability of escaping liability. Then
multiply the compensatory damages amount by your punitive damages multiplier.
The resulting number is the base punitive damages amount.
4. The base punitive damages amount should not be adjusted because of any of
the following considerations:
a) reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct;
b) net worth, revenues, or profits of the defendant;
c) potential harm, that is, the harm that might have been caused by the defendant's
conduct;
d) gain or profit that the defendant might have obtained from its harmful conduct;
e) litigation costs borne by the plaintiff;
f) components of harm that you did not include in compensatory damages;
g) whether the harm included personal injury.
What amount do you believe the base punitive damages amount should be?
B. PUNISHMENT
Punitive damages fulfill the punishment objective to the extent that they cause
defendants to penalize their blameworthy employees who engaged in reprehensible
behavior.
In considering punishment, you should keep in mind that the defendant's payment
of compensatory damages already may lead to the punishment of blameworthy em-
ployees to some extent.
In considering how well the imposition of punitive damages will fulfill the pun-
ishment objective, you should also bear the following in mind:
a) the extent to which you believe blameworthy employees can be identified and
penalized by the defendant. The easier this identification is, the higher should
be the level of punitive damages.
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b) the extent to which you believe that innocent parties will suffer as a result of
the imposition of punitive damages on the defendant; such parties might include
shareholders as well as customers, who may have to pay higher prices for the
defendant's products or services. The more likely it is that innocent parties will
be punished, the lower should be the level of punitive damages.
In the light of these considerations, you should determine the amount of punitive
damages that you believe will accomplish proper punishment.
What amount of punitive damages do you believe the punishment amount be?
C. DETERMINATION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Punitive damages should be an amount between the amount that you found ap-
propriate for the purpose of deterrence and the amount that you found appropriate
for the purpose of punishment. If you attach greater importance to the deterrence
objective, punitive damages should be closer to the amount that you found best to
promote deterrence. If you attach greater importance to the punishment objective,
punitive damages should be closer to the amount that you found best to promote
punishment.
Using your estimates of the base punitive damages amount, the punishment amount,
and your assessment of the company's behavior, what do you believe the punitive
damages amount should be? Please write the amount of punitive damages you believe
is appropriate in the blank below.
APPENDIX B
SCENARIO I
The Toxic Chemical Research Institute develops new chemicals for industrial uses.
As part of its operations, it generates concentrated amounts of highly toxic chemical
wastes. Usually, a waste disposal company removes the waste to a safe landfill set
aside for that purpose. However, owing to extremely adverse weather conditions, the
landfill is temporarily closed. The company has 12 steel drums of dangerous chemicals
that it is eager to remove from the plant before a major production run for its most
important customer. There is no legal way to dispose of the chemicals quickly. The
company decided instead to violate U.S. government rules for safe disposal of dan-
gerous chemicals.
The shift manager, worried about the accumulating chemicals, decided that the
easiest way to get rid of the chemicals would be to dump them in the stream behind
the plant. The manager knew that there was a 25 percent chance that the EPA inspector
was going to be visiting the plant next week and that if he did the dumping would
be discovered. Thus, there was also a 75 percent chance of not getting caught. Despite
the risk of getting caught, he told his crew that it was worth the gamble because it
was the easiest way to get rid of the chemicals, and it was dangerous to keep the
chemicals.
An EPA inspector did identify the spill and determine that Toxic Chemical Research
Institute was responsible for it. No health hazard to humans occurred, but there was
$100,000 in cost to the city owing to additional water treatment costs. The EPA fined
the company $100,000 to cover these costs. The company paid this $100,000 amount.
The city is now seeking punitive damages to punish the company's behavior. Your
task is to determine the amount of punitive damages to levy, if you believe punitive
damages are warranted.
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Below are the guidelines for determining these amounts, provided as part of the
judge's instructions.
SCENARIO 2
The Toxic Chemical Research Institute develops new chemicals for industrial uses.
As part of its operations, it generates concentrated amounts of highly toxic chemical
wastes. Usually, a waste disposal company removes the waste to a safe landfill set
aside for that purpose. However, owing to extremely adverse weather conditions, the
landfill is temporarily closed. The company has 12 steel drums of dangerous chemicals
that it is eager to remove from the plant before a major production run for its most
important customer. There is no legal way to dispose of the chemicals quickly. The
company decided instead to violate U.S. government rules for safe disposal of dan-
gerous chemicals.
The shift manager, worried about the accumulating chemicals, decided that the
easiest way to get rid of the chemicals would be to dump them in the stream behind
the plant. The manager knew that there was a 1 percent chance that the EPA inspector
would be visiting the plant next week and that if he did the dumping would be
discovered. His best estimate is that there was only a 1 percent chance of being
inspected, caught and penalized. Thus, there was a 99 percent chance of escaping
any penalty. Despite the risk of getting caught, he told his crew that it was worth
the gamble because it was the easiest way to get rid of the chemicals, and it was
dangerous to keep the chemicals.
An EPA inspector did identify the spill and determine that Toxic Chemical Research
Institute was responsible for it. No health hazard to humans occurred, but there was
$100,000 in cost to the city owing to additional water treatment costs. The EPA fined
the company $100,000 to cover these costs. The company paid this $100,000 amount.
The city is now seeking punitive damages to punish the company's behavior. Your
task is to determine the amount of punitive damages to levy, if you believe punitive
damages are warranted.
Below are the guidelines for determining these amounts, provided as part of the
judge's instructions.
SCENARIO 3
The Toxic Chemical Research Institute develops new chemicals for industrial uses.
As part of its operations, it generates concentrated amounts of highly toxic chemical
wastes. Usually, a waste disposal company removes the waste to a safe landfill set
aside for that purpose. However, owing to extremely adverse weather conditions, the
landfill is temporarily closed. The company has 12 steel drums of dangerous chemicals
that it is eager to remove from the plant before a major production run for its most
important customer. There is no legal way to dispose of the chemicals quickly. The
company decided instead to violate U.S. government rules for safe disposal of dan-
gerous chemicals.
The shift manager, worried about the accumulating chemicals, knew that if he
dumped the chemicals nearby that his company would definitely be caught and
punished. To prevent being caught, his crew loaded the chemical drums onto un-
marked trucks and dumped the chemicals in a rural stream at 3:00 A.M. The manager
believed that this "midnight dumping" would reduce the risk of getting caught to 1
in 100. Thus, there is a 99 percent chance of escaping any penalty. He decided that
it was worth the gamble because it was the fastest way to get rid of the chemicals,
and it was dangerous to keep the chemicals.
An EPA inspector did identify the spill and determine that Toxic Chemical Research
Institute was responsible for it. No health hazard to humans occurred, but there was
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$100,000 in cost to the city owing to additional water treatment costs. The EPA fined
the company $100,000 to cover these costs. The company paid this $100,000 amount.
The city is now seeking punitive damages to punish the company's behavior. Your
task is to determine the amount of punitive damages to levy, if you believe punitive
damages are warranted.
Below are the guidelines for determining these amounts, provided as part of the
judge's instructions.
SCENARIO 4
The Toxic Chemical Research Institute develops new chemicals for industrial uses.
As part of its operations, it generates concentrated amounts of highly toxic chemical
wastes. Usually, a waste disposal company removes the waste to a safe landfill set
aside for that purpose. However, owing to extremely adverse weather conditions, the
landfill is temporarily closed. The company has 12 steel drums of dangerous chemicals
that it is eager to remove from the plant before a major production run for its most
important customer. There is no legal way to dispose of the chemicals quickly. The
company decided instead to violate U.S. government rules for safe disposal of dan-
gerous chemicals.
The shift manager, worried about the accumulating chemicals, knew that if he
dumped the chemicals nearby that his company would definitely be caught and
punished. To prevent being caught, his crew loaded the chemical drums onto un-
marked trucks and dumped the chemicals in a rural stream at 3:00 A.M. The manager
believed that this "midnight dumping" would reduce the risk of getting caught to 1
in 100. Thus, there is a 99 percent chance of escaping any penalty. He decided that
it was worth the gamble because it was the fastest way to get rid of the chemicals,
and it was dangerous to keep the chemicals.
An EPA inspector did identify the spill and determine that Toxic Chemical Research
Institute was responsible for it. No health hazard to humans occurred, but there was
$100,000 in cost to the city owing to additional water treatment costs. The EPA fined
the company $100,000 to cover these costs. The company paid this $100,000 amount.
The city is now seeking punitive damages to punish the company's behavior. Your
task is to determine the amount of punitive damages to levy, if you believe punitive
damages are warranted. In his closing statement, the plaintiff's attorney made the
following arguments: "Your job as jurors is to impose a penalty which will make
this corporation, and others, conduct their business in a way which protects the
defenseless citizens of Texas who have no other way of getting the company to be
responsible. This is your job. A penalty against this company has to be one that they
will notice. It would not destroy this company or even cause them long-term financial
harm to impose a penalty on them of $50 million, about 20 percent of their net worth,
or about two and one-half times their annual profit. Certainly a minimum penalty
should be 1 year's profit, about $25 million, so the range you may want to consider
is between $25 million, about 1 year's profit, and $50 million. I don't think that
anything less than $25 million would have much effect as far as deterring them and
getting them to be more careful in their operations."
Below are the guidelines for determining these amounts, provided as part of the
judge's instructions.
SCENARIO 5
The Toxic Chemical Research Institute develops new chemicals for industrial uses.
As part of its operations, it generates concentrated amounts of highly toxic chemical
wastes. Usually, a waste disposal company removes the waste to a safe landfill, set
aside for that purpose. However, owing to extremely adverse weather conditions the
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landfill is temporarily closed. The company has 12 steel drums of dangerous chemicals
that it is eager to remove from the plant before a major production run for its most
important customer. There is no legal way to dispose of the chemicals quickly. The
company decided instead to violate U.S. government rules for safe disposal of dan-
gerous chemicals.
The shift manager, worried about the accumulating chemicals, knew that if he
dumped the chemicals nearby that his company would definitely be caught and
punished. To prevent being caught, his crew loaded the chemical drums onto un-
marked trucks and dumped the chemicals in a rural stream at 3:00 A.M. The manager
believed that this "midnight dumping" would reduce the risk of getting caught to 1
in 100. Thus, there is a 99 percent chance of escaping any penalty. He decided that
it was worth the gamble because it was the fastest way to get rid of the chemicals,
and it was dangerous to keep the chemicals.
An EPA inspector did identify the spill and determine that Toxic Chemical Research
Institute was responsible for it. No health hazard to humans occurred, but there was
$100,000 in cost to the city owing to additional water treatment costs. The EPA fined
the company $100,000 to cover these costs. The company paid this $100,000 amount.
The city is now seeking punitive damages to punish the company's behavior. Your
task is to determine the amount of punitive damages to levy, if you believe punitive
damages are warranted. Before being placed on the jury you read about a similar
case that took place in California. A jury there fined the company $50 million in
punitive damages. However, the company appealed claiming the award was excessive.
The punitive damages amount was reduced to $25 million by the appeals court in
California. The company claimed that this amount was still too high and that it would
continue to fight the award in court.
Below are the guidelines for determining these amounts, provided as part of the
judge's instructions.
APPENDIX C
STATISTICAL APPENDIX
A more detailed statistical analysis of the survey results indicates the respective
roles of the scenario characteristics on the damages amounts selected. Table CI
presents a series of regressions in which the natural logarithm of the various damages
amounts was regressed on characteristics of the case scenarios and various demo-
graphic factors. The four variations in the survey structure from the base scenario 1
were characterized by the following zero-one indicator variables: a variable for
whether the probability of detection was low, a variable for whether the dumping
activity was stealthy, a variable for the plaintiffs attorney anchoring effect, and a
variable for the media anchor. These regression results consequently distinguish the
incremental role of each case characteristic, holding constant other aspects for the
survey version and demographic factors.
Equation (1) pertains to the deterrence damages value. While this amount should
be extremely sensitive to the probability of detection, that value has no statistically
significant influence. Similarly, stealthy behavior is inconsequential as well. What
matters are the two anchoring manipulations. The plaintiff's attorney anchor boosts
the deterrence value by over an order of magnitude, and the media anchor raises it
by 260 percent. On the basis of the Polinsky-Shavell formula, these values should
play no role, but the detection probability should.
Equation (2) in Table C l presents the analogous equation for the punishment value.
The results are very similar. The stealth of the defendant's behavior should be in-
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TABLE C I
REGRESSION EQUATIONS FOR DETERMINANTS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES LEVELS
Deterrence Punishment Punishment Final Award Final Award
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Low probability of detection .323 -. 400 -. 586 -. 054 -. 071
(.430) (.502) (.437) (.407) (.223)
Stealthy behavior .477 .627 .351 .598 .134
(.422) (.493) (.430) (.400) (.218)
Lawyer anchor 2.495* 3.058* 1.616* 2.671* .326
(.422) (.492) (.452) (.399) (.234)
Media anchor 1.282* 1.667* .926* 1.863* .624*
(.428) (.499) (.440) (.405) (.225)
In(deterrence value) .578* ,499*
(.058) (.034)
In(punishment value) .360*
(.029)
Adjusted R2  .226 .233 .419 .298 .792
NoTE.-All dependent variables are log values. Each equation also includes age, female, black, Hispanic, other
nonwhite races, some college, college graduate, professional, smoker, seat belt user, and a constant term. Standard
errors are in parentheses.
* The coefficient is significant at the 95% confidence level, two-tailed test.
fluential, but is not, and the anchor values play a very strong role in driving the
punishment amounts.
Equation (3) reported in Table Cl adds the log of the deterrence value to the
punishment equation. Doing so complicates the interpretation of the scenario char-
acteristics, which have both a direct effect on punishment as well as an indirect effect
through the deterrence value. Nevertheless, the patterns of influence for the scenario
characteristic variables remain largely the same. Deterrence and punishment values
are also related, as an increase in the deterrence value assessed by 10 percent will
boost the punishment answer by 5.8 percent. The relationship between deterrence
and punishment is strong and statistically significant, but less than a one-to-one
relationship.
Given the similarity of the influences driving the deterrence and punishment values,
one would expect the final damages amounts to be driven by similar factors. That
indeed is the case. The probability of detection and the stealthiness of behavior are
not significant influences, but the anchoring effects are in equation (4) reported in
Table C 1.
Once both the deterrence and punishment values are included in equation (5) in
Table CI, the effect of the anchors diminishes, but the media anchor variable remains
statistically significant. Much of the influence of anchors is through their effect on
the deterrence and punishment values respondents used in arriving at their final
punitive damages award. The weights on the deterrence and punishment values are
.50 and .36. Thus, there is a substantial influence of each component. These results
do not contradict the earlier findings that subjects set the final damages amount at
more than a simple weighted average of the two values. Because of the inclusion of
other variables related to the survey versions, such as anchoring influences, the
findings in Table C1 are more appropriately interpreted as indicating the separate
effect of the damages values, as distinguished from the role of demographic factors
and case characteristics.
